Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright:
The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects

Stan Liebowitz
University of Texas at Dallas

Stephen Margolis
North Carolina State University

August, 2004

Abstract
The case of Eldred v. Ashcroft, which sought to have the Copyright Term Extension
Act (CTEA, aka Sonny Bono Copyright Act) declared unconstitutional, was recently
decided by the Supreme Court. A remarkable group of seventeen economists including
five Noble laureates, representing a wide spectrum of opinion in economics, submitted an
amicus curie brief in support of Eldred. The economists condemned CTEA on the
grounds that the revenues earned during the extension are so heavily discounted that they
have almost no value, while the extended protection of aged works creates immediate
monopoly deadweight losses and increases the costs of creating new derivative works.
More important, we believe, than the particulars of this case, is the articulation of the
economic issues involved in copyright extension. These issues are not fully developed in
the brief, nor is the case as one sided as the Eldred economists claimed. First, private
ownership of creative works may internalize potentially important externalities with
respect to the use of existing works and the creation of derivative works. Second, the
Eldred economists neglect the elasticity of the supply of creative works in their analysis,
focusing instead solely on the benefits received by authors. Consequently, they may
underestimate the potential for additional creativity, which confers benefits immediately.
Third, the Eldred economists neglect certain features of copyright law, such as fair use,
the distinction between idea and expression, and the parody exemption, which mitigate
the costs of copyright. Finally, we present data that counters a common claim that
copyright extension so far out in the future can have little effect on creativity. The small
fraction of books that have the majority of commercial value when they are new appear
to remain valuable for periods of time that are consistent with the expanded term of
copyright under CTEA.

I. Introduction
On May 20, 2002, seventeen economists including five Nobel laureates presented an
amicus brief discussing the economics of copyright extension in support of the petitioners
in Eldred v. Ashcroft, a case before the Supreme Court that sought to have the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA) ruled unconstitutional.1 The
economists’ amicus brief was unusual in several respects, not the least among them the
fact that it brought together a group of economists almost as notable for its diversity of
opinion (which spans the ideological spectrum from Kenneth Arrow to Milton Friedman)
as for its academic distinction.2
When such a distinguished and broad panel of economists appear to agree on a
subject, it would be reasonable for their audience to presume that they reflect the views of
the profession as a whole. Further, it would be natural to expect that any document that
these economists would put their name on would meet the same exacting standards that
are normally associated with their works. That this document was used in an important
legal matter should raise the care taken by these economists to a level even higher than
that associated with their academic writing. In short, readers would have every reason to
believe that the arguments put forward in this document are sound both in the small
details and the large conclusions. Yet this is not the case.
The Eldred case is now resolved, with the Supreme Court finding against the
petitioners. Nevertheless, active debates in both the legal and economic literatures raise
questions regarding the particulars of copyright law and its underlying principles—the
issues raised in the economists’ brief continue to be important. Critics of copyright are
making bold claims, even to the point of advocating its abolition.3 Scholars in both law
and economics will continue to address the economics of copyright length in the
foreseeable future, so it is important that they understand the imperfections in the
economist’s brief. In what follows we provide something of a counterweight to the
amicus brief, identifying some points that the economists ignored, clarifying some
discussions that they did not get quite right, and providing some data that runs counter to
some assumptions that they made.
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Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners at 12, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No.
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The signatories to the amicus brief are: George A. Akerlof, Kenneth J. Arrow, Timothy F. Bresnahan,
James M. Buchanan, Ronald H. Coase, Linda R. Cohen, Milton Friedman, Jerry R. Green, Robert W.
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Michele Boldrin and David Levine suggest that no protection of intellectual property, either de facto or de
jure, is needed, The Case against Intellectual Property American Economic Review, Vol. 92, 2 May
2002, 209-212. Raymond Ku suggests that intellectual property protection is unnecessary for digital
products, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology,
University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 69, no.1 (2002).
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II. Background
The CTEA has two major provisions. First, it extends the term of copyright
protection for a given work from fifty years after the author’s death to seventy years after
the author’s death.4 Second, it applies this extension retroactively to works that were
produced prior to the act.
The CTEA was criticized vigorously from a number of perspectives, but most
forcefully from an active academic community that has advocated expansion of an
“information commons.” Eldred v. Ashcroft became one of the vehicles for this
opposition to copyright extension and became a cause celebre in parts of the Internet and
academic communities. The litigation was coordinated at the Berkman Center for Internet
and Society and argued before the Supreme Court by Laurence Lessig, a leading advocate
for expanding the public domain.
Eric Eldred publishes on the Internet literary works that have entered the public
domain. The CTEA prevented certain works that he had intended to provide through his
web site from entering public domain. Eldred claimed that the CTEA was
unconstitutional on two grounds. First, it violated the patent and copyright clause of the
constitution, which specifies that patents and copyrights are provided for “a limited time”
and that they are authorized in order to promote the “progress of science and the useful
arts.5” Second, Eldred claimed that the CTEA was a violation of free speech. The
Supreme Court has now ruled on the case, rejecting Eldred’s claims.
While legal briefs are not necessarily the place to look for balanced and nuanced
views, the prominence of the Eldred economists make their brief a second look. Absent
appropriate scrutiny, their brief may well be taken by scholars and the general public as
the definitive views on the costs and benefits of copyright. While we cannot argue that
the CTEA extensions are clearly efficient, we do argue that the case is not so one sided as
the one presented in the economists’ brief.
There are important aspects of the economics of copyright that were ignored or not
fully considered by the Eldred economists. They overlook factors, such as the elasticity
of supply of creative works, which might reverse their conclusion about the impact of
copyright extension on the creation of new works. They neglect the possibility of network
effects in the market for derivative works that might make a copyright commons
uneconomic, independent of any impact on supply. Finally, they avoid the difficult
empirical work that would be needed to provide an answer to the question they entertain.

III. Basic Points in the Brief
The amicus brief makes two points:
a.

The portion of the law making the increased copyright length retroactive
makes little economic sense. Copyright is granted to provide incentives for
authors to create. Yet there can be no incentive impact when copyright is
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This is for copyrighted works produced by individuals.
A portion of the clause reads, “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts by securing for a
limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective rights and discoveries.”
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extended on items that have already been created under the previous copyright
rules.
b.

The extension of copyright, from life plus 50 year to life plus 70 years, has a
current effect on creation only through incremental revenues that are many
years in the future. The effects on present values of these incremental
revenues are so small that they can have little incentive effect. The
incremental deadweight losses brought about by the copyright extension also
occur far in the future and also are discounted heavily. Although both factors
are likely to be very small, the Eldred economists argue that copyright should
not be extended because copyright also imposes current costs on the creators
of new copyrighted items, who reuse old material in their new works.

We agree with the Eldred economists that point (a) above is an easy call, but only if
the analysis is restricted to incentives to create. We will argue at length below, however,
that there are other important considerations that might reverse this conclusion. We find
that point (b) is not an easy call and is incompletely explored in the economists brief. We
next consider each of these points in reverse order. Following that, we present data that is
relevant to the evaluation of copyright extension.

IV. New Works: Comparisons of costs and benefits.
The optimal length for copyright is not something that anyone can claim to know
with any precision. Although there have been claims in the literature that the optimal
length is so short that copyright is unnecessary, there has been very little recent and
serious examination of this issue.6
Putting aside, for now, the matter of efficient management of existing works, how
much can we say about the efficiency of copyright extension?
To make a full a determination of the costs and benefits of copyright extension
economists would need to know more about these markets than we currently do know.
Economists are far from alone in this ignorance; the information requirements are severe.
The data that we would need, but do not have, are (1) the number and value of new works
brought forth by extensions of copyright duration (the elasticity of supply of creative
works and the surplus created by additional works); (2) the reduction of surplus for
reproductions of copyrighted materials under extended copyright relative to the surplus
that would be generated if copyright protection were less lengthy (the increased
unnecessary deadweight losses).
The general structure of the tradeoff between creation and use is well known.
Nevertheless, a detailed construction of the values to be compared is rarely discussed, so
we present that now.
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Some of the earlier claims were: Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books 1
Economica, 167, 1934; R. Hurt,, and R. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 American
Economic Review, 421, May 1966.

3

A. The Gains and Losses from extending copyright
The Eldred economists use a bit of shorthand to describe the benefits from an
extension of copyright—they talk about the additional royalties generated by the
extension. With distant payments being so far in the future, the present values of gains to
current authors generated by extending copyright from, say, 90 to 100 years, are likely to
be very small.
The benefits to society, however, are not the same as the present value of payments
going to the copyright owners.7 The Eldred economists emphasize that the present values
of payments to authors are small in order to suggest that these payments can have only
very limited effects on creation of additional works.
Yet, small increases in payment need not have small impacts on the creation of
additional works. There is certainly a possibility for some authors, in some range of
income and propensity to create, that a small increase in present value could make an
important difference in their creative output due, perhaps, to reaching a point where
authors switch to full- time writing.8

Figure 1: Distribution of Authors

RS

Opportunity Cost of Writing

At a conceptual level, which is the level of the amicus brief, it is certainly possible
that there might be many potential authors with similar opportunity costs who, at the
current copyright length, are on the margin of writing books. In Figure 1, for example, we
present a very tight distribution of opportunity costs for authors. Even a fairly trivial
increase in royalty payments, such as an increase in the present value of royalties from R
(the dashed line) to S (the dotted line) might lead to a substantial increase in the number
of works if the distribution is dense at those magnitudes. In this instance of a tightly
7

Wendy J. Gordon also makes this point in Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for
Dross 36 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Fall 2002 159.
8
An example might be Charles Ives, working at his insurance job by day and writing music in his spare
time.
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packed distribution of costs of creation, small increases in payments from an expansion
of copyright might bring forth large increases in the number of creative works, with
associated large social benefits.9
Thus, the Eldred economists’ focus on the royalty streams is incorrect. They should
have focused instead on the impact of copyright changes on the value of new works
forthcoming. This is a distinction that can make a difference as we demonstrate in
Section C. First, we briefly review the economic impacts of changes in the term of
copyright.

B. Productive and Unproductive Deadweight Loss
Calling a deadweight loss ‘productive’ might seem to be oxymoronic, but in fact
some deadweight losses serve a useful function where they are unavoidable consequences
of an incentive system for which we have no feasible better alternative.
Under a copyright regime, the deadweight loss engendered by the copyright is a
byproduct of the incentives to the creator that are generated by the copyright. With a
system of private ownership providing the incentive for creation, there cannot be a
reward to the creator without also having an apparent deadweight loss in the consumption
market.10
While it is misleading to refer to copyright as equivalent to monopoly, the monopoly
model is the easiest to apply and is the standard vehicle for considering the issues that we
take up here.11 Moreover, the monopoly model is the framework for the arguments in the
amicus brief. In what follows, we will refer to “books,” but it should be evident that
‘books’ here stand in for any creative work.
Figure 2 is the standard textbook treatment of monopoly. Assume it represents
market for reproductions of a particular book title for some period of time. The demand
for this title lasts for multiple time periods, all identical to the first.
The perfectly competitive solution is a price of Pc and quantity Qc, which yields no
profit in the reproduction market with which to pay the creator of the title. This
maximizes the surplus in the reproduction market (1+2+3+4+5) for this title. However,
the title will not be produced if the creator requires a positive payment to induce creation,
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We assume that this large increase in works also leads to a large increase in surplus. We also assume that
the new works do not decrease the surplus generated from older works. It is possible, of course, that the
potential surplus for copyrighted works is limited, and that the increased surplus from these new works
comes at the expense of decreased surplus for works that would otherwise have been consumed in place of
the new works.
10
Perfect price discrimination can avoid the deadweight loss, and we note that various approximations to
such price discrimination can reduce this loss, though such measures provide only imperfect relief.
11
Although copyright provides a monopoly over the particular title, there might be very many very close
substitute titles available. This monopoly is really no different than the fact that every firm gets a monopoly
on the name of the individual product that they sell. Kia and Mitsubishi have a monopoly over automobiles
with their names, although few would argue that they have monopoly power in the automobile market. This
point is made in Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property 53 Vanderbilt Law Review, November, 2000, p. 1727.
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which implies that no surplus at all will occur without some copyright protection. This is
one of the problems identified by Arrow in his classic 1962 article.12

Figure 2: The Market for Reproductions of a Title
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Though it is not ideal, copyright (monopoly) provision still is likely to produce a
positive value for society compared to no production at all. Under copyright, if creation is
induced, society benefits from the production of copies of this title in the amount of
1+2+3+4, less the fixed costs of creation. Area 5 is normally called a deadweight loss
since we can imagine a situation where area 5 could be part of the surplus. Being able to
imagine an improvement, however, is not the same as being able to bring it about, as
pointed out by Demsetz in his classic response to Arrow.13 Once we accept a copyright
regime as the mechanism to stimulate production of creative works, however, area 5 no
longer is a feasible component of the surplus and thus it isn’t really a deadweight loss.
Area 5, if we need to label it, can be thought of as a ‘productive’ deadweight loss, or the
cost of copyright, since it is required in order to generate any surplus at all.
The debate between Demsetz and Arrow largely hinged on the definition of
‘efficient’. Was the efficient output the theoretical ideal, as suggested by Arrow, or was it
the best that we could actually achieve, as suggested by Demsetz. Although we believe
that Demsetz won that point, we do not need to answer that question for the purpose of
evaluating copyright length. Once we accept that copyright is the mechanism that is to be
used to provide incentives for creative works, and once we accept that all books are to be
given the same copyright term, then the ‘productive’ deadweight losses are best
12 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in R. Nelson
(ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).
13 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 Journal of Law and
Economics 12, 1-22 (1969).
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understood as irrelevant to welfare considerations since there is no other manner in which
they could become part of the surplus within the confines of the chosen copyright
mechanism.14
The analysis further suggests that we need to be careful how we treat these
deadweight losses in a determination of the optimal copyright duration. For example, if
we were to adopt a methodology of comparing the gains to the losses when extending
copyright, a proper cost-benefit analysis would not contrast the sum of areas 1 through 4
with area 5 since area 5 isn’t a loss. In other words, even if area 5 were larger than
1+2+3+4, it would be incorrect to conclude that society would be better off not having
this good produced at all, compared to monopoly production.
Of course, this diagram now illustrates gains (of copyright extension) with no
balancing losses. How then could we arrive at any optimal length of copyright less than
infinity? The answer is to realize that once a creator has received sufficient payment to
generate creation, any further payment is unnecessary. And any further deadweight losses
are now unnecessary, meaning that deadweight losses from this point forward are no
longer productive.
If the creator receives a payment in the first period (say areas 3+4) that fully covers
the cost of creation, then in the second period area 5 would now be an old-fashioned
deadweight loss. In this second period we have a cost of copyright extension with no
balancing benefit since the book would have been created based only on the revenues
from the first period.
Who would ever argue that we should treat all ‘deadweight losses’ alike?
Unfortunately, we suspect that such conclusion might well occur to the casual reader of
the economists Amicus brief, from which we take the following:
First, the CTEA [Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998] extends
the period during which a copyright holder determines the quantity
produced of a work, and thus increases the inefficiency from abovecost pricing by lengthening its duration. With respect to the term
extension for new works, the present value of the additional cost is
small, just as the present value of incremental benefits is small. [Italics
added]. 15
The Eldred economists talk about additional costs from extending the term of
copyright. They do not tell us how these costs are calculated except for a brief discussion
of the harm brought about by the monopoly restrictions on quantity. There is certainly no
attempt to distinguish those deadweight losses that are productive, that is, necessary to
bring about additional creative works, and those that are not.
Even more troublesome is the claim that the present value of additional benefits is
necessarily small. The parallel construction between the benefits and costs in the
italicized sentence implies, incorrectly, that both benefits and costs occur far into the
future, which leads to their being heavily discounted and thus small. The logic is correct
14 This also assumes that copyright owners cannot perfectly price discriminate, since the ability to
perfectly discriminate would convert area 5 into producers’ surplus.
15
Page 1 of the brief.
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for the increased costs of copyright extension (which only start occurring when the
current copyright term expires), but it is not true for the benefits. The present value of
additional revenues to authors might be heavily discounted (and small), but this need not
imply that the impact of these revenues on the creation of works is small since we need to
know something about the elasticity of creation before we can make any such statements.
Further, the benefits from any additional creative works begin to accrue immediately—
they are not discounted far into the future, the way that incremental revenues and
incremental costsare.

C. An Example of Beneficial Copyright Extension
Figure 3 shows how copyright extension might lead to rather large benefits even with
a lengthy original term of copyright. In this diagram, we assume that all titles have equal
value to consumers and equal costs of reproduction, but have different costs of writing.
On the horizontal axis we have new titles, aligned in increasing order by the cost of
creation. All the dollar values are discounted to present values.

Figure 3
Cost of Writing
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The opportunity cost of creation is represented by the upward sloping ‘Cost of
Writing’ curve. For the purposes of this example, we have put a relatively flat inflection
point in the middle to indicate that in this region there are many new titles with similar
opportunity costs of writing (as in Figure 1). Books will be written as long as the
(discounted) rewards to the author are greater than the costs of writing the book, where
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writing costs are stipulated to include editing, design, and any other fixed cost of creation
that are avoided by follow-on publishers. These costs of writing are not included in the
calculation of consumer’s and producer’s surplus in the reproduction market, which are
modeled in this diagram. We assume that the market for publishers’ acquisition of titles is
perfectly competitive, so that the entire producer’s surplus in the market for the
reproductions of a single title is captured by the author.
Since each title is assumed to have identical values to consumers and identical costs
of reproduction, the (present value) of the sum of producer and consumer surplus is the
same for each book and can be represented by a horizontal line for any potential
copyright regime. The ideal value of each title (e.g., perfect price discrimination by the
publisher selling copies of titles, the present value of areas 1-5 in Figure 1) is represented
by the highest horizontal line labeled PV[CS+PS]ideal. For any number of titles, the area
under this line represents the potential value of the titles to society, that is, the total value
of the titles if each were exploited to exhaust all possible gains from trade.
T* represents the optimal number of titles that would be produced in this ideal world,
since all titles to the left have a potential surplus in the market for reproductions that is
greater than the cost of writing the book, and all titles to the right have a creation cost
greater than the potential surplus.
In a world of copyright, however, the surplus in the reproduction market is less than
ideal. In Figure 3, we represent two cases: an infinite copyright life (represented by the
number 999) and a 60 year copyright life, indicated by the subscripts. Although the
extension of copyright length proposed by CTEA was far less than infinity, we use the
assumption of infinite life to make our point.
The present values of the realized total surplus (producer plus consumer surpluses)
under either copyright regime are shown in the diagram as PV[CS+PS]60 and
PV[CS+PS]999 for a 60 year and infinite copyright life, respectively. Assuming that the
demand for each book title persists for more than sixty years, the present value of the
total surplus in the reproduction market is less with an infinite copyright than with a 60year copyright since the reproduction market would never achieve its efficient (nonmonopoly) output under an infinite copyright regime. The vertical difference between
these two horizontal lines might be quite small because the surpluses after 60 years are
highly discounted in present value terms, as the Eldred economists argued, although we
have drawn them as having a non-negligible difference in value.
The payments received by the authors are the (present values) of the producer’s
surplus in the reproduction market, and are reflected by horizontal lines, PV[PS]
(subscripted for the different copyright terms), with obviously smaller values than the
total surplus.16
We are now ready to examine how a change from a 60 year term to an infinite term
affects the market. The increase in unnecessary deadweight loss for the books that would
16

Although the vertical difference between the PS60 and PS4 lines is drawn as being less than the difference
between the [PS+CS]60 and the [PS+CS]999 lines, this need not be the case. If it were not, our example
would only get stronger since the losses from copyright extension would be smaller than the area in the
figure.
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have been written with a copyright length of 60 years (those books to the left of T60 in
Figure 3) is given by the rectangle with the embedded spheres. This area reflects the
lower surpluses in the reproduction market that result from the increased life of the
monopoly restriction (from 60 years to infinity).
The change in the number of new titles depends on the additional reward received by
authors and on the elasticity of creation with respect to reward. We have drawn this
elasticity to be very high, as indicated by the flat portion of the curve representing the
cost of creation. Even though the increased rewards to creators are very low, the high
elasticity leads to a relatively large increase in the number of titles. The value to society
from the increase in titles is given by the cross-hatched rectangle, which is drawn to be
larger than the harm from the unnecessary deadweight loss. In this example, it is clear
that an infinite copyright is better than a 60 year copyright. This is a possibility that is
shortchanged by the Eldred economists.
Note that the optimal (efficient) number of titles under either copyright regime is
greater than the actual number of titles (because authors only receive part of the surplus)
and that the optimal number of titles declines as copyright term increases (because total
surplus decreases). Note as well that the optimal number of titles is always less than the
ideal number of titles, because the total potential surpluses are not realized under any
real-world copyright regime.
The full benefits from a copyright extension include the consumer and producer
surpluses now and in the immediate future of any additional works that result from
copyright extension. These benefits are not all highly discounted. It is these full
benefits—not the relatively minor incremental revenues that the Eldred economists
discussed—that must be traded off against the additional deadweight losses that occur far
in the future.17
The correct assessment of copyright extension would balance the present value of the
surpluses generated by the new works that result from the copyright extension against the
heavily discounted additional unnecessary deadweight losses for those works that would
be created in the absence of the extension.
Finally, there is the question of how realistic the construction of Figure 3 might be.
That depends on many factors. In the real world, how dense is the distribution of
opportunity costs otherwise portrayed in Figure 1? Where in that distribution are the
points representing pre-copyright-extension copyright length and extended copyright
length? The assumption in Figure 3 that all titles are of ex post equal value is clearly
false. Are the most valuable books produced by writers on the left or right side of the
distribution in Figure 1? Are the more valuable titles likely to get produced first? All in
all, without additional research the Eldred economists are not in a position to state
whether the current copyright length is too long or too short.

17

The Amicus brief argues that the deadweight losses are felt immediately. This is only true, however, for
aged preexisting works under retroactive copyright extension and is not generally the case. In the case of
retroactive extension, the works that would have gone into the public domain in the immediate future,
instead remain under the control of the copyright owner, generating immediate deadweight losses.
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V. Retroactive Extension of Copyright Term
Point (a) appears to be an easy call because lengthening the term of copyright can
have no effect on the size or quality of the body of creative works that existed at the time
that CETA was enacted. Copyright extension cannot reach back in time to bring forth
additional work.
Lengthening the term of copyright increases the price for using already-created
materials that would otherwise move into the public domain. This price elevation results
in the monopoly deadweight loss that occurs where intellectual property is priced above
reproduction cost. It is easy to see which way the cost-benefit calculation goes. Because
there are no new creations resulting from retroactive extension of copyright, there can be
no benefit from new works, and clearly there are costs.
The Eldred economists thus argued that the argument regarding retroactive copyright
extension is completely one sided. There are substantial costs of the extension in the form
of added deadweight losses, and no realistic benefit of increased creative activity. While
that simple logic is unassailable, the economists’ evaluation of retroactive extension
ignored some benefits of copyright ownership and, by neglecting some features of
copyright law, overstated a cost of copyright.
The amicus brief does acknowledge the possibility that such after-the-fact extensions
of copyright might increase the incentives of future authors who may expect the same
treatment in any subsequent copyright extension. They regard this as a minor influence
and we agree. The Eldred Court did note, however, that congress has consistently applied
copyright extensions retroactively, citing fairness arguments that legislators have
repeatedly raised to support that practice.

A. Efficiency of ownership
The political fight over the Sonny Bono act appears to have largely been about the
impact on already existing works. Indeed, potential revenues in 2110 probably are not a
big incentive for Marshal Mather or Shania Twain. But the rights to derivative works are
an important matter to current owners of aged works and to non owners, such as Mr.
Eldred, who would now like to use these works. Public choice considerations nicely
predict the players in the recent controversy—on both sides they are parties with interests
in old works. These interests are worth pursuing because they are not discounted by
seventy, eighty or one-hundred years.
Eldred is aggrieved because he is unable to republish works that were written in the
nineteen twenties. In support of the CTEA, amicus briefs were submitted by various
owners of mature copyrights. One of the most interesting of these was submitted by Dr.
Seuss Enterprises, Allene White, and Barbara and Madeline Bemelmans. Allene White is
the owner of many copyrights of E. B. White (Stuart Little, Charlotte’s Web); Madeline
and Barbara Bemelmans are the owners of the copyrights of Ludwig Bemelmans, the
creator of the Madeline series. If you do not know who Doctor Seuss was you might want
to limit your academic reading for a while.
The issue is management of existing creative works. The economists' brief considers
only the monopoly deadweight losses—one side of the argument—and concludes that all
11

the weight is against extension. But there is another issue, not noted in the economists'
brief18, but well known to economists: open access is not a universally preferable way to
manage a resource. We note that the tragedy of the commons is thought not to hold for
non-rivalrous goods since the viewing of The Grinch by one person does not prevent
others from viewing it as well. It is possible, however, that one person’s owning a copy
of The Grinch might alter the utility of another person’s ownership, or that one person’s
creation of a derivative work based on the Grinch might alter the value of another’s
derivative work. These possibilities are explored below, where several distinct reasons
are given for consumers to have preferences with regard to the number of copies of a
work that exist, or the number and character of derivative works.
We are certainly not the first to note a stewardship role of intellectual property
protection. Edmund Kitch19 makes the argument that patent is better understood not as
monopoly but as a claim-staking system, allowing efficient exploitation of a
technological realm. In a recent paper on copyright, Landes and Posner20 elaborate on the
advantage of ownership for the management of valuable creative works. They note the
possibility of excessive or inappropriate uses of intellectual properties and the role of
copyright in avoiding the common access problem.

1. The possibility of misuse
Consider one claim of the Dr. Seuss brief. These copyright owners note a number of
recent feature films made from their properties. These movies are large risky investments
that would be even more risky if the studios could not be assured some degree of
exclusivity. They cite as an example The Grinch (2000), which cost over $125 million to
produce. How would the prospects for the movie be affected if just before its release, the
Grinch character suddenly appears in pornographic movies or advertising for cigarettes,
altering the public’s view of the character? The copyright owner’s role in this is not
unlike that of the private owner of a natural resource that can be subject to crowding. In
either case, the owner prevents dissipation of a valuable asset by misuse of the asset. A
profit maximizing owner would be expected to pick that set of derivative projects that
maximizes profits. The question is balance between the restriction output brought about
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The closest the economists come to mentioning this issue is their acknowledgement that extending
copyright might increase the copyright owners’ incentives to invest in improvements to the creative work
(p. 9) They mostly dismiss this as an issue, noting that “a twenty-year copyright extension will have little or
no incremental effect. Misuse or excessive activity in the creation of derivatives does not appear in their
discussion, nor does any role of copyright in addressing such problems.
19
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of a Patent System” 20 Journal of Law and Economics,
265-90. (1977)
20
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,” John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 154, (2nd series) 11-15 (2002). Landes and Posner discuss the possibility
of a copyright externality and note the possibility of technological, as opposed to mere pecuniary
externalities. In turn, they are reacting to a statement in a brief by a group of intellectual property law
professors that declares that “There can be no overgrazing of intellectual property, however, because
intellectual property cannot be destroyed or even diminished by consumption.” Denis S. Karjala,
“Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors in Opposition to J.R. 604, H.R. 2589,
and S. 505, The Copyright Term Extension Act, Submitted to the Joint Committees of the Judiciary,” Jan.
28, 1998.
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by monopoly considerations versus restrictions brought about to prevent lost value due to
misuse.
There are, of course, many expensive derivative works such as movies that are based
upon creative works that are entirely in the public domain. The question is whether they
are produced as regularly or as well, and whether the level of utilization improves upon
that which occurs under exclusive ownership.21 This is an empirical question to which
economists do not yet have the answer.
Malicious or offensive derivative uses of some creative works might seriously
diminish the value of the creative work without sufficient offsetting value. The existence
of a Madeline Does Dallas might lead to some awkward questions during bedtime stories.
Of course, the law accepts some damage to the value of creative works when they are
subject to parody or criticism. But these fair-use exceptions to copyright protection exist
because they clearly serve a purpose that is expected, on average, to pass a benefit-cost
test.

2. Snob, Veblen, and Aesthetic Network Effects
A second concern for efficient management of intellectual property concerns a
particular type of network effect. As currently used, the term network effects is almost
exclusively associated with positive effects--each user's utility increases with the number
of users. But as we know from congestion externalities, network effects can also be
negative.22 One of the earliest and most original treatments of network effects (although
that term was not yet in use) was the paper by Harvey Leibenstein who considered both
positive effects (“bandwagon”) and negative effects (“snob” and “Veblen”). Snob effects
occur when consumers derive more utility as there are fewer other users of a product, the
opposite of the current use of network effects. Veblen effects occur when consumers
derive additional utility from a product as its market price gets higher.
Although the term ‘snob’ is surely catchy, it carries an unfortunate connotation that
mischaracterizes many of these network effects. Ordinary consumers evidence such
preference about many kinds of goods. It can be something as unsnobbish a simple
preference for variety. An image may delight the eyes if it is seen every now and then,
but it may seem absolutely banal if it appears on every telephone pole.
Architectural works, which are protected by copyright, are instructive examples.
Builders in housing developments usually offer a variety of elevations of houses of the
same floor plan so that they don’t end up with too many houses that look the same. The
practice of building varied elevations cannot be monopoly restriction to elevate price,
since the restriction on any one design does not restrict the total output of a set of very
good substitutes. Yet builders do vary designs and often enter contracts obligating them
to do so. The production of different elevations does increase cost, relative to building the
same design over and over again, yet the total value of a development must increase by
more than these additional costs, or builders would discontinue the practice. In tract
21

Further, are they produced under greater secrecy, raising their costs, in order to protect themselves from
contemporaneous imitators?
22
See Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 1994, 8-2 Pp. 133-150.
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developments, the negative network effect of visually identical houses may be
internalized by a builder’s ownership of a large number of lots. In other instances it can
be internalized by a subdivision’s covenants and restrictions. And of course, this
“aesthetic” network effect (if we can put in our own term) can be internalized by
copyright.
These are real external effects, not just pecuniary ones. Many consumers derive less
utility if their house looks just like all the others in the subdivision, as so memorably
criticized by a professional anti-snob, Pete Seeger, who applied the phrase “ticky-tacky”.
If this consumer preference for variety could not be internalized by the market, total
wealth would be reduced. The decisions of individual consumers might lead to too little
variety, since the harm to others from additional uses of a design does not directly enter
the decision maker’s utility calculus.
The scope of such external effects is quite large and we would suggest
underappreciated in the literature. For example, the literature on resale price maintenance
suggests a ‘demonstration’ motive by manufacturers who try to keep retailers from
charging too low a price.23 The story is that some retailers may not provide needed
demonstration services and might instead free-ride on retailers that do provide it, causing
the service to disappear under competitive pressures. An additional explanation we might
suggest, especially for those cases where demonstrations of a product seems unimportant,
would be that some retailers do not provide enough of an exclusive aura about their
products (snob effects), or some retailers might lower the price to a level that distresses
other consumers of the product (Veblen effect), in either case lowering the utility for all
the other users of the product.
Such external effects also might explain why competition does not lower the prices
of high-end items (top of the line autos, stereo equipment, appliances, and so forth) which
are known to have higher margins and yet where monopoly power would appear to be
missing. Competitors with lower prices for equivalent products would not take customers
away from the high priced product, and competition would not reduce markups, if the
customers derive utility from the fact that the original product is sold to a more exclusive
clientele. Such external effects can also explain why diamonds are preferred to cubic
zirconias.
Within the world of copyrighted works, evidence of these aesthetic network effects is
plentiful. The practice among artists of numbering prints and publicizing the total number
in the series, with a promise not to increase the number of prints, might be a mere
monopoly restriction, but it also might be a way of increasing the actual utility that a
consumer enjoys. Snob effects might help to explain why original paintings sell for so
much more than almost perfect forgeries that seemingly provide the same visual

23

Since the manufacturer receives the same price from the retailer independent of the retailer’s price, it
would appear that the manufacturer would be pleased to have the retailer increase total sales without the
manufacturer needing to lower his price. Yet there are numerous cases where manufacturers try to limit
retailers from charging too little. See Telser, L. G., Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? Journal
of Law and Economics, October 1960.
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experience.24 These effects might help explain the behavior and existence of the designer
clothing industry and, of course, the custom-home building industry.
In all these cases, demand itself is a function of the number of users. Where these
effects appear, they affect the shape of the demand curve—they are not simply
movements along a demand curve.
Where there are technological network effects such as these, it is important that these
effects be internalized. Firms producing copies or derivatives of creative works, after the
expiration of copyright, may be in the position of fishermen on an open access lake. They
produce at their own private optima, not taking into account the effects that they have on
other producers. Ownership can effectively manage these interactions, and copyright
provides that ownership. The difficulty, of course, is distinguishing between pecuniary
and real (technological) effects. Internalizing pecuniary effects leads to monopoly;
internalizing real effects leads to efficient levels of activity.
These network effects may be prevalent for some classes of creative works. They
may be important for simple copies of visual works that are publicly displayed, musical
and literary works that are used in advertising, and for decorative items. They may also
be important for derivative works of all sorts. At a minimum, we would need to know
something about the empirical realities of these markets before making pronouncements
about the efficiency, of lack of efficiency, in the copyright law.

B. The costs to current creators of derivative works
A major portion of the economists' Eldred brief is devoted to a purported increase in
the costs of creation resulting from copyright extension. They claim that because creative
works derive inspiration and form from the creative works of the past, copyright stifles
new creation, and extended copyright stifles creation unnecessarily. Their discussion is
largely misguided in that it fails to take account of some of the special features of
copyright.
The economists' brief cites a seminal paper by Landes and Posner25 that notes the
costs and benefits of copyright extension. The economists' brief is largely consistent with
the first part of Landes and Posner, which presents a model of copyright, but it neglects a
central purpose of their paper. Landes and Posner build a model of an abstracted
copyright law to illustrate the properties of an optimal level of protection, the
determinants of the optimal level of protection, and the trade-off that exists at the
optimum. They then use their model as a platform for explaining some of the specific

24

Obviously, for works still under copyright, a forgery might sell for less since it violates copyright. For
the large number of works in the public domain, however, it is still the case that copies that can only be
discerned by experts will not sell for anywhere as high a price as the original.
25
William Landes and Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law” 18 Journal of Legal
Studies 325-363 (1989). This paper develops a severely abstracted model of copyright duration in which
all copying is prohibited for the duration of copyright. Their purpose is to use this model to explore the
tradeoffs implicit in copyright so that they might explain some of the provisions of actual copyright law.
Landes and Posner suggest that the fair use defenses and the protection of only the expression of an idea,
rather than the idea itself mitigate some of the potential costs of copyright protection.
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features of actual copyright law. Their approach is summarized in the following fair use
reproduction of their work:26
We shall see in Section II that various doctrines of copyright law,
such as the distinction between idea and expression and the fair use
doctrine, can be understood as attempts to promote economic efficiency
by balancing the effect of greater copyright protection—in encouraging
the creation of new works by reducing copying—against the effect of
less protection—in encouraging the creation of new works by reducing
the cost of creating them.27
The Eldred economists' discussion of the costs of derivative works takes no note of
the moderating influences of these features of copyright. There is no question that
creators of derivative works have the greatest latitude, and therefore the lowest costs,
where the works that they would employ are in the public domain. But the fair use
exceptions and the distinction between the idea and the expression provide sufficient
relief from the restrictions that a very large share of creative re-uses of copyrighted works
is permitted.28
Interestingly, we could in this space present a fairly loose paraphrase of Landes and
Posner’s discussion of both the distinction between expression and the idea and fair use,
and although it might be a breach of academic etiquette (particularly if we didn’t admit
what we were doing) it would not be a copyright violation. There are two reasons. First,
these matters are discussed in a number of places, so it would be difficult to establish that
we were copying Landes and Posner. Second, while we would be reflecting the ideas in
their discussion, we would not—unless we got lazy and started copying—be using their
expression.
Copyright does not protect ideas, only the expression of the ideas. Many economists
have seen “It’s a Wonderful Life,” the Jimmy Stewart movie classic, and have read The
Choice, Russell Roberts' fine treatment of free trade. Although Roberts uses the plot
device of a man who must return to earth to earn his angel’s wings, (in Roberts’ work it’s
David Ricardo), his book does not infringe the movie. Though clearly an important
creative element of the movie, the plot device is an idea, which is not protected by
copyright. Television addicts will also note the flock of shows that followed the Friends
format or the current proliferation of survivor type shows. Artists do indeed draw on old
themes, and they are allowed to do so. On the other hand, they are not allowed to
incorporate details of copyrighted works. So the Eldred economists are correct, copyright
does raise artists’ costs—they do have to do some work themselves. But because only
expression and not ideas are protected, extensive parts of the culture are not, as is
sometimes claimed, walled off from creative re-use.
26

We hope it is fair use, because we expect that their lawyers would be better than ours.
Page 333. So long as we limit our attention to the creation of additional works, we must conclude that
retroactive extension of copyright is inefficient.
28
Fair use is a defense against the claim of copyright infringement, and is often used to allow small (or
sometimes large) amounts of copyrighted works to be copied when the copying is likely to not harm the
market. The most complete analysis can probably be found in Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:
A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Columbia Law Review
1600-1657, 1982.
27
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Fair use doctrines also include important exemptions to copyright that further expand
the legal re-uses of existing works. An important example of fair use is parody, which
allows works to be reused in certain kinds of creative transformations. For example,
comical parodies of books or movies that use many recognizable details of the original
work are permitted.
A recent case that captured a great deal of public attention illustrates that very
extensive use of a creative work can fall under fair use. Alice Randall’s novel, The Wind
Done Gone, prompted objections from the Margaret Mitchell Trust, owners of the rights
to Gone with the Wind. The Wind Done Gone uses the characters and plot elements from
the earlier work, but views them from the perspective of the black people who shared
Tara with Scarlett O’Hara and the others. Although an initial injunction delayed
publication, an appeals court subsequently found that this new perspective both
transformed the original work substantially and did so to provide important criticism.
Here again, copyright did not bar creative use of important elements of our culture that
were essential to a creative work of social criticism. Critics of copyright have deplored
the fact that Ms. Randall was forced to defend her fair use in court, but the fact that
copyright occasionally imposes legal costs is not a sufficient argument for its curtailment.
Additionally, Ms. Randall could have told her story without so directly borrowing the
particulars of Gone with the Wind and its reservoir of publicity and sentiment, although
that might have limited the scope of her market.

VI. What do economists (vaguely) know about
copyright length
The CTEA’s extension of the copyright term occurs very far into the future relative
to the creation of a copyrighted work. What are the odds that the extension will have any
consequence for a creative work? To answer this we need to know something about the
longevity of copyrighted works.
The Amicus brief reports a Congressional Research Service study that finds that only
a small percentage of works copyrighted during the 1920s and 1930s and renewed in the
1950s and 1960s had commercial value in 1998 (11% of copyrights in books, 12% in
musical works, and 26% in motion pictures).29 It also reports that less than 1% of books
had their copyrights renewed.30 This is an interesting result, but it can be very misleading.
Copyrighted works do not start life as equals. The great majority of copyrighted works
never have much market value. It is well-known that a small percentage of titles account
for a large share of sales of copyright materials.
In the mid 1980s Liebowitz conducted an unpublished examination of the longevity
of titles. Among other things, that study examined the concentration of sales. In 1986,
adult hardbound trade books and book club sales together totaled approximately $1.7
billion.31 It is known that there were approximately 25,000 new hardbound trade titles
29

Edward Rappaport, Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values, Congressional
Research Service Report 98-144E (1998).
30
Rappaport, page 6. It is not clear what the basis for this statistic is.
31
Table 1, pp. 414 1988 Bowker Annual. Adjust Hardcover represent 1.025 billion and book clubs .698
billion.
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produced that year, in addition to the hundreds of thousands of old titles in that
category.32 Best-sellers for that year, which numbered less than two hundred, therefore,
represented an almost infinitesimal percentage of these titles. Yet the top one hundred
and twenty four best-sellers in 1987 generated combined sales of approximately 35
million copies.33 The average 1986 price of a hardcover book was $32.34 Thus bestsellers were likely to have generated nearly $1 billion dollars in sales out of a total of
$1.7 billion.35 Note that this does not include sales of best-sellers from previous years still
selling in relatively large numbers. These numbers back up anecdotal evidence—that the
distribution of book sales is very highly skewed toward the more successful book titles.
One question, then, is the longevity of those titles that actually have significant
market value and make up the majority of sales in the market, i.e., extremely successful
books. To address this question, Liebowitz constructed a small data set consisting of a
sample of titles reviewed in Book Review Digest in the 1920s, along with best sellers.
Book Review Digest reviewed approximately 25% of new titles. Generally, these were
the titles attracting the most attention, written by the more important authors and
published by the better known houses. Table 1 gives the number of these titles that were
in print after fifty eight years.
More than half of the best-sellers in the sample remained in print for a long enough
period of time that the 1976 extension to the copyright law would likely have affected the
present value of future book sales.36 Even for non-best-sellers, a third still survived after
58 years, indicating that a fairly significant share of other books would likely be affected
by changes in copyright law even when the copyright length is quite long.
Table 1 : Life Expectancies Of Titles
Number
Of Titles
All Books
Best Sellers
Non Best
Sellers

236.00
91.00
145.00

Number in
print After
58 Years
97.00
49.00
48.00

32

% in print
After 58
Years
41%
54%
33%

Table 1 pp. 403 in the Bowker 1988 Annual indicated 41,925 new titles in 1986, including paper. Tables
2 and 3, pp. 404-405 indicated approximately 17,000 new paperback titles in 1986.
33
Pages 522-528 in the 1988 Bowker Annual provide details on the 1986 number of copies sold of the 60
leading titles, and information that an additional 64 titles sold approximately 150,000 copies each.
34
Table A, pp. 408 in 1988 Bowker Annual. The average price for fiction hardcover titles was $17, so if
fiction dominated the bestseller sales the number in the text might need to be adjusted downward, but
would still have bestsellers represent a very large component of sales.
35
This could be taken as evidence to support the idea that optimal copyright length is not very long. If it
were the case that best-selling authors derive far more income than their next best opportunity, then for two
thirds of the market, copyright would be longer than necessary. Without further examination of the income
distribution of these authors, however, we cannot assert the truth of such a statement.
36
Prior to 1976 the copyright term in the US was 28 years followed by an additional renewal of 28 years.
The 1976 law increased this to 50 years after the death of the author.
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Table 2 presents a further breakdown of longevity by category of title. There clearly
are large differences among titles in different categories in the likelihood of remaining in
print for 58 years. For some categories, the number of books remaining in print for this
period is quite large.
Table 2 : Percentage of Titles surviving more
than 58 years
Category

All Titles

Academic
Philosophical
History
Biography
Religion
Poetry
Fiction
Mystery
Comedy
Autobiography
Art
Travel
Sports

68%
52%
51%
49%
46%
43%
36%
23%
25%
19%
17%
6%
0%

Best Sellers
Removed
68%
41%
43%
42%
40%
40%
40%
16%
0%
11%
17%
6%
0%

What is the import of this for an analysis of Eldred? Mostly that the inferences about
depreciation rates of books drawn from overall survival rates are likely to be misleading.
The great majority of books are obscure. They never had much market value. Their
demise does not reflect depreciation so much as the fact that they were never really
viable. They are unlikely to have significant value in the public domain just as they had
insufficient value under copyright to keep them in print. But, for the small number of
titles generating the lion’s share of economic value, life expectancy is rather long.
Extending copyright might have only a small change in expected revenues for these
books, but not because they have gone out of print or lost commercial potential.

VII. Conclusion
It is quite amazing that copyright duration, a topic that has brought forth hardly any
economic research, could bring together such a strong group of economists. Given both
the ideological range and the distinction of this group, readers might well conclude that
there is no other side to the economics of this issue. Apparently, copyright extension joins
rent control as one of very few things that economists seem to agree on.
Nevertheless, we believe that there is another side to the economics of copyright
extension different than the one put forward by this distinguished group. A more
complete view, we argue, requires consideration of the responsiveness of creative efforts
to marginal incentives and the function of ownership of intellectual property beyond the
incentive to create. A more nuanced view requires attention to the features of copyright
law that mitigate some of the potential harms of the right to exclude copying and the
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creation of derivative works. A more correct view requires an examination of empirical
magnitudes that has yet to be fully undertaken.
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